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Endogenous Technological Spillovers: Causes and
Consequences
Abstract
We develop a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. We analyze a game in which
firms can first invest in cost-reducing R&D, then compete on the human-capital market for their
knowledge-bearing employees, and finally enter the product market. If R&D employees change firms,
spillovers arise. We show that technological spillovers are most likely when they increase total industry
profits. We use this result to show that innovation incentives are usually stronger for endogenous than
for exogenous spillovers and that endogenous spillovers may reverse the result that innovation
incentives are stronger under quantity competition than under price competition. Finally, we explore the
robustness of our results with respect to contractual incompleteness and the number of R&D workers.
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Abstract: 
We develop a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. We analyze a game in 
which firms can first invest into cost-reducing R&D, then compete on the human capital 
market for their knowledge-bearing employees, and finally enter the product market. If R&D-
employees change firms, spillovers arise. We show that technological spillovers are most 
likely when they increase total industry profits. We use this result to show that innovation 
incentives are usually stronger for endogenous than for exogenous spillovers and that 
endogenous spillovers may reverse the result that innovation incentives are stronger under 
quantity competition than under price competition. Finally, we explore the robustness of our 
results with respect to contractual incompleteness and the number of R&D-workers. 
 
Keywords: Innovation, Spillovers, Product Market Competition, Contracts 
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1. Introduction  
Knowledge spillovers play a role in various economic contexts. Growth theorists have focused 
on the importance of knowledge creation and diffusion (Romer 1986, 1990, Aghion and 
Howitt 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991). At least since Marshall (1920), spillovers have 
been identified as a possible source of agglomeration, and hence as potentially important for 
economic geography.1 Most of the existing literature on R&D and research joint ventures has 
emphasized that spillovers drive a wedge between private and social returns, thereby leading 
to inefficient R&D levels and the need for cooperation (e.g. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
1988, Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992, Suzumura 1992).2 When spillovers are modeled, they 
are usually assumed to be exogenous. However, spillovers are a result of decisions made by 
economic agents: firms have to take costly actions to acquire spillovers, and they may be able 
to prevent spillovers at some cost. In this paper, we therefore treat spillovers as endogenous, 
and we explore how this modification affects familiar results on innovation incentives. 
The particular route towards endogenization of spillovers that we follow in this paper uses the 
human capital market. It is widely acknowledged that spillovers arise when employees change 
jobs and take all their knowledge with them, some of which is not specific to their original 
firm.3 There are many prominent examples where firms have hired managers, scientists and 
other employees to obtain knowledge in this fashion. At the heart of a controversy between 
General Motors and Volkswagen in the nineties was VW’s desire to get access to knowledge 
of the former GM employee Lopez and his group. Similarly, after German banks moved to 
London to establish a stronger position in investment banking, they hired a considerable 
number of employees from competitors to obtain industry-specific knowledge (Economist, 
January 18, 1997, p. 74). After World War I, DuPont ”... elected to lure experienced German 
chemists to the United States, with pay packages of up to $25,000 per year - 10 to 15 times 
their German salaries.” (Hermes 1996, p.61) This move played an important role in the 
development of the American dyestuff industry, which at the end of World War I had not yet 
acquired the knowledge necessary to compete against the German firms. 
                                                           
1 Recently, Martin and Ottaviano (1997) have made progress towards an integration of the growth theory literature and 
economic geography. 
2 See Leahy and Neary (1997) for a comprehensive discussion. 
3 Two other reasons for spillovers are often discussed: informal communication and inference from other firms’ actions, e.g., 
exposure to their products (see e.g. Geroski 1995). 
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These examples are by no means isolated events. The thriving business of headhunting 
testifies to the importance of the human capital market for the transfer of knowledge between 
firms. In addition, the possibility of such knowledge transfer is economically relevant even 
when it does not actually occur. The outside option of leaving a firm can improve an 
employee’s internal bargaining position, resulting, for example, in wage increases or 
promotions. Anticipating this, firms may reduce their innovation efforts. Clearly, general legal 
restrictions (e.g. patent laws) or specific contractual arrangements sometimes limit the extent 
to which inside knowledge may be used in a new firm. Nevertheless in many circumstances 
such measures do not have much bite. Also, one of our main goals is to show that, under 
plausible circumstances, knowledge spillovers through the human capital market might not 
even occur in cases when they are allowed in principle. We therefore deliberately consider a 
setting where employees can choose new employers freely, and may use whatever knowledge 
they have wherever they want. 
In this setting, we investigate the incentives for firms to acquire the services of knowledge-
bearing employees, and, similarly, the incentives for firms to prevent the departure of 
employees to other firms. We determine the conditions under which technological spillovers 
arise endogenously when duopolists compete for knowledge in the market for human capital 
and for profits in the product market. We analyze a game in which firms can first try to carry 
out a cost-reducing innovation, an effort which may or may not be successful. Then, they can 
attempt to obtain additional knowledge spillovers by offering suitable labor contracts to 
knowledge-bearing R&D employees of other firms; and by offering sufficiently high wages to 
their own employees, they can prevent knowledge spillovers to competitors. Knowledge 
spillovers can be asymmetric, if only one firm hires the competitor’s employee, or symmetric, 
if both firms hire each other’s employees. Finally, firms enter product market competition.  
In this framework we first investigate the causes of spillovers. An unsurprising, but useful 
result is that spillovers are more likely to arise in equilibrium when they increase total industry 
profits.4 In addition, we make the following main points. First, we show that firms’ costs of 
obtaining and preventing spillovers reflect wage increases for knowledge bearing employees. 
For example, when both firms have innovated successfully and symmetric spillovers occur, 
R&D employees obtain a wage increase equal to the difference between industry profits under 
symmetric and asymmetric spillovers. 
                                                           
4 Related results arise in the licensing literature (Gallini 1984, Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
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Second and most importantly, we apply our results to understand how endogenizing spillovers 
affects innovation. Unsurprisingly, innovation incentives tend to be stronger for endogenous 
spillovers than in the exogenous case, in particular, if product market competition is vigorous 
or innovations are significant. For Bertrand competition, the costs of preventing spillovers for 
a firm even turn out to be zero if the competitor has not innovated successfully. Hence, though 
spillovers are allowed in principle, innovation incentives are the same as if they were 
excluded by definition.5 Thus, the focus of public policy towards R&D on the correction of 
technological externalities by encouraging joint ventures, possibly even at the cost of less 
competition in product markets, may not always be justified when spillovers are endogenous6. 
Another main point is that in situations where innovation incentives are stronger for quantity 
than for price competition under exogenous spillovers, the reverse result may hold with 
endogenous spillovers.  
A first step in the direction of endogenizing spillovers through the human capital market was 
taken by Pakes and Nitzan [1983]. They consider the optimal labor contracts for a single firm 
hiring employees who may be able to use the information acquired during the R&D process in 
a rival enterprise.7 Unlike Pakes and Nitzan, we consider the strategic interaction between 
firms. For all our results, the human capital market plays a crucial role. Other approaches to 
endogenous spillovers which do not consider this market lead to different results. For 
instance, in Katsoulacos and Ulph [1998]8, two firms first choose whether to invest into 
reducing their marginal production costs. Then they decide whether to share the knowledge 
obtained in the first period with the opponent. Hence, contrary to our framework, parties that 
want to obtain spillovers cannot engage in activities to obtain spillovers (e.g. poaching 
workers). Katsoulacos and Ulph show that technological spillovers will not arise if firms 
compete in the same industry and their research activities are perfect substitutes: given the 
other firm’s behavior, a firm can only lose from sharing its secrets. This differs from our 
model because we allow firms to attract knowledgeable employees from other firms, and we 
take the costs of preventing spillovers into account. 
                                                           
5 Similarly, for significant innovations, i.e., substantial cost reduction opportunities, the costs of preventing spillovers are 
low, so that innovation incentives are much higher than for exogenous spillovers. 
6 Leahy and Neary (1999) also argue that spillovers may not be a severe problem for R&D incentives, but for different 
reasons. To acquire spillovers, firms need absorptive capacity, which is developed by own R&D. 
7 Also related is a paper by Anton and Yao (1995) who consider innovation incentives of firms whose employees might start 
their own companies. 
8 For a similar model, see Poyago-Theotoky (1999). 
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model. In section 3, we 
analyze the human capital market by establishing the subgame equilibria for given innovation 
results of firms. In section 4 we apply the results to the most widely known models of 
competition in product markets. In section 5, we apply our results to innovation incentives. In 
section 6, we will explore how our results are affected if knowledge is created by a group of 
R&D persons within firms. Section 7 considers alternative contractual arrangements. In 
section 8, we discuss the relation to the licensing literature. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Model 
We consider a three-period duopoly model.  
2.1. Innovations 
In period 1, two risk neutral firms, ,2,1i  decide whether to invest I >0 in cost-reducing 
development activities. Denote the investment of firm i  by  I Ii  0, . The firm’s research 
projects are not necessarily identical. To carry out a project, a firm needs specific human 
capital. For instance, a car company may want to redesign its cars so that they are easier to 
manufacture and thus cost less to produce. This requires basic engineering knowledge, design 
and manufacturing techniques (CAD, CIM), etc. We assume that the firm can hire people 
possessing the required human capital. For now, we suppose only one R&D person is 
necessary to undertake the research project. The wage costs for this person are included in the 
overall project costs.9  
With probability q, R&D  will lead to a reduction   of marginal costs.10 For later reference, 
denote the success probability of one firm conditional on the competitor being successful 
(non-successful) as v (z). We allow for a non-negative, but not necessarily perfect correlation 
between the firms’ research efforts. A small correlation can be interpreted as a case where the 
knowledge needed for R&D is very diffuse: different firms may then try different paths 
towards cost reduction. Nearly perfect correlation makes sense when the necessary R&D-
activities are very clearly defined. Finally, let si  denote the innovation results of firm i : si  0 
if the firm does not invest or is not successful; si  1 characterizes a successful innovation.  
                                                           
9 In section 6, we discuss how the results change if there is more than one R&D person in each firm. 
10 Innovation activities can be different. To reduce notation we assume, that the cost reduction is the same in both cases. 
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2.2. The Market for Human Capital 
In period 2, both firms can try to gain additional knowledge by offering suitable wage 
contracts to the R&D employee of the other firm and can attempt to prevent knowledge 
spillovers by offering sufficiently high wages to their own R&D employees. The activities on 
the  human capital market determine whether knowledge is transferred between firms. We 
make the following assumptions. 
First, knowledge is usually not completely transferable across firms. Suppose a firm has not 
invested or that its innovation efforts have not been successful. Then, if it can attract the R&D 
person of the successful firm, he will be able to replicate a fraction    0 1,  of the original 
cost reduction in his new firm. Second, knowledge can be duplicated within the firm. Once the 
R&D employee has implemented a cost reduction, costs remain low, even if the employee 
changes the firm.11 Therefore, if a firm loses its employee to the competitor, the only 
disadvantage results from the competitor’s lower costs. Third, the knowledge of the 
competitor may be a substitute or a complement for a firm’s own knowledge. A successful 
innovator who recruits the employee of a successful competitor obtains a cost reduction of 
( ),1+    0  .   0  characterizes knowledge substitutes, i.e., a successful firm does not 
gain anything from buying the know-how of the competitor. The greater  , the stronger are 
the knowledge complementarities between the two firms.12  
Assumption 1A: Wages can be conditioned on the innovation success of the R&D employees 
of both firms.  
Assumption 1A implies that firms can write complete labor contracts and thus firms can 
observe and verify the entire success vector at the beginning of period 2. An alternative and 
equivalent assumption is that firms observe and can verify the full success vector when 
product market competition starts, since this guarantees that product market competition takes 
place under complete information about costs.13  
                                                           
11 Clearly, an investing firm has an incentive to secure that the knowledge of R&D projects is codified and distributed within 
the firm, so that it does not depend on the future services of the knowledge-bearing employee. 
12 The importance of complementarities in knowledge production has been pointed out by Griliches (1979) and Gerowski 
(1995), and recently by Klette (1996), among others. Allowing complementarities partly addresses the point that 
spillovers are only valuable if the receiving firm engages in R&D-activities itself: if  is high, investment is required to 
obtain substantial benefits from spillovers and thus to learn from competitors (see also Cohen and Levinthal 1989, Leahy 
and Neary 1999). 
13 In section 7, we shall consider incomplete labor contracts such that wages can only be conditioned on the success of the 
firm where an employee is working.  
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By 1A, if firm i’s innovation result is si , it offers wage contracts  w s sii i j,  depending on si  
and js  to its own employee, if he continues to work for the firm. Similarly, it offers wage 
contracts   w s sij i j,  , ij  , to the competitor’s employee. Observe the logic of the notation: 
the first of the two subscript indices corresponds to the firm that makes the wage offer; the 
second index stands for the firm for which the employee  worked so far. The first and second 
term in brackets give the innovation result of the firm making the offer and the competitor, 
respectively. We shall drop the terms in brackets and write wii  and wij  whenever this is 
unambiguous. We shall then assume that each employee chooses to work for the firm that 
offers higher wages (for details see section 3.1). 
2.3. Product Market Competition 
In period 3, firms enter product market competition. We allow different forms of interaction 
such as quantity, price or quality competition with homogenous or heterogeneous products. 
We only assume that a unique Nash equilibrium in the product market competition stage 
exists. We assume complete information about marginal costs of both firms, so that success 
vectors are common knowledge. The equilibrium depends on these marginal costs and hence 
on the knowledge firms have obtained, either through innovation activities or through 
purchasing the know-how which is embodied in human capital. If initial costs are c0  for both 
firms, product market profits are uniquely determined by c0  and the combination of marginal 
cost reductions ri  and rj  that both firms have achieved compared to the status quo. We 
therefore denote the profits of firm i as );,( 0crr jii . These are gross profits, including R&D-
wages. For firm i the following four possibilities for ri  can arise. 
ri =0   if the firm neither innovates successfully itself, nor benefits from spillovers. 
ri = if the firm innovates successfully, and does not benefit from spillovers. 
 ir  if the firm does not innovate successfully itself, but benefits from spillovers. 
ri =(1+  )  if the firm innovates successfully itself and benefits from spillovers. 
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In the following, we shall often drop c0  and  and write   i i jr r/ , /  =  0;, crr jii . Hence, 
we obtain    0;,,1 cii   ;   i 1 1 ,   0;,)1( ci   , etc. We shall always 
assume that  0;, crr jii  is non-decreasing in ri  and non-increasing in rj , which is true for 
most conceivable forms of oligopolistic competition. 
2.4. Summary: The Structure of the Game 
We summarize the overall game, which consists of three stages. 
Stage 1: Firms choose Ii   0, I  R&D-levels. 
Stage 2: The success vectors become common knowledge Conditional on their own 
innovation success si  and the success of their competitors sj , firms simultaneously 
offer wage contracts    w s s w s sii i j ij i j, , ,  to R&D employees. Employees choose 
to work for the firm that offers the highest wage. Firms implement cost reductions. 
Stage 3: Firms enter product market competition. Profits  0;, crr ji  are realized. 
3.  The Likelihood of Spillovers 
We now investigate the determinants of the spillover patterns. 
3.1. Statement of the main result 
The following cases have to be considered in the second stage: no firm is successful; both 
firms are successful; only one firm is successful.14 We assume that equilibrium profits depend 
only on the marginal costs of both firms, not on the firm index. Hence, we write 
   0,10,1 i  ; )1,0()1,0( i  , etc. Recall that knowledge is exchanged if a successful 
R&D person switches the company. Whether this happens depends on the wages offered in 
both companies. We assume that a successful R&D person remains within the company if the 
wage offered by his current employer and by the competitor are the same; if the competitor 
offers a higher wage, the R&D worker accepts his offer. Thus, given the success vector 
( s s1 2, ), the wage offers    w s s w s s11 1 2 12 1 2, , , ,    w s s w s s21 2 1 22 2 1, , ,  determine workers’ 
employment decisions, thus resulting in a unique vector ( r r1 2, ) of cost reductions. This cost 
structure results in product market profits );,(
0
crr jii  and net payoffs  
                                                           
14 Since investment outlays are sunk, we do not have to distinguish between a firm that has not invested and a firm that has 
invested but was not successful. 
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(1) ),(),();,( 0 jiijijjiiiiijii sswsswcrr    
where  ij  takes values 1 or 0 according to whether firm i sets wages high enough to obtain the 
services of the worker from firm ij  or not, and  ii  is defined analogously. We distinguish 
between the following cases. 
A. Only one firm, say firm 1, is successful: Spillovers occur if and only if    w w21 110 1 1 0, ,  . 
With spillovers, total industry profits are    ( , ) ( , )1 1 . Without spillovers, total 
industry profits are  ( , ) ( , )1 0 0 1 . 
B. Both firms are successful: Symmetric (or bilateral) technological spillovers occur if 
   w wij jj11 11, ,  for i j, ,2; 1 i j . If they do, total industry profits are 2 1 1  ( , )  . 
Asymmetric (or unilateral) spillovers from firm 1 to firm 2 occur if    w w21 1111 11, ,  and 
   w w12 2211 11, , , resulting in total industry profits    ( , ) ( , )1 1 11   . 
In all other cases no spillovers occur, and total industry profits are 2 11 ( , ) . 
Note that, if one firm is successful, admitting spillovers increases total industry profits if 
     ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 1 1 0 0 1   . For two successful firms the corresponding condition is 
)1,1(2)1,1()1,1(   . In the following subsections, we establish the 
following intuitive result. 
Proposition 1: For any given vector of first-period cost reductions, there always exists a 
second-period equilibrium that maximizes total industry profits. 
Proposition 1 is not very surprising, but it is useful for three reasons. First, we shall see that its 
derivation yields additional insights about the equilibrium wage structure: it is quite possible 
that employees can extract the entire surplus from spillovers. Second, we shall use proposition 
1 to show how spillover activity depends on parameters such as the extent of product 
differentiation or the type of competition (Bertrand vs. Cournot). Third and most importantly, 
we shall use the result to revisit familiar results on innovation incentives. 
3.2 Characterization of wages and spillovers 
Obviously, firms only want to offer above market wages to employees with valuable 
knowledge. We normalize wages for employees without such knowledge to zero: 
11 
(2)         w w w wii ii ij ij0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0, , , , .      i j, ,1 2, i j . 
Recall our assumption that an employee remains with his firm if he does not receive a better 
offer. More precisely, we assume that an R&D person leaves his current firm if the 
competitor’s offer is higher by an amount of at least  .   can be arbitrarily small although we 
can think of it as the smallest currency unit that distinguishes two wage offers. We obtain: 
Lemma 1: In any subgame perfect equilibrium;    w s s w s sii i j ji j i, ,   or 
    , jiii ssw    ijji ssw , ,  i j, ,1 2. 
Lemma 1 follows directly from the Bertrand feature of wage competition in the second stage. 
The winner of the wage auction for the successful R&D person i  pays the smallest wage 
necessary to obtain the services of the R&D-employee. Hence, a firm must match the 
competitor’s wage to prevent the employee from changing jobs, and it must add   to get the 
other firm’s employee. No other constellation can arise in equilibrium. 
3.3. Equilibria when only one Firm is Successful 
The following proposition characterizes spillovers when one firm has innovated successfully, 
while the other firm has failed or has not invested in R&D.  
Proposition 2: Let 1 be the successful firm, 2 the competitor. 
 (i) Suppose        0,11,,10,1   .  Then, there are spillovers in equilibrium; 
wages satisfy    w w11 211 0 0 1, ,       ,10,1  . The resulting subgame payoffs 
(net of wages) are   1,  for firm 1,         ,1     1 1 0, ,  for firm 2.15 
(ii) Suppose             1 0 1 1, , ,   0,1 . Then, there are no spillovers in equilibrium; 
wages satisfy        w w11 211 0 0 1 1 0 1, , , ,     . The resulting subgame payoffs (net 
of wages) are    ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 0 1 0 1   for firm  1  0,1;   for firm 2. 
The result is proved in the appendix.16 The inequalities in the two propositions have simple 
interpretations. The benefits for a successful firm from preventing spillovers (not considering 
wages) are     ,101,  ; the benefits for the competitor from obtaining spillovers are 
   1,01,   . Hence, whether there will be spillovers depends on whether, ignoring wages, 
                                                           
15 A second equilibrium exists with both wages increased by  . 
16 In the boundary case that        1,01,,10,1    both equilibria are possible. 
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a successful firm gains more from maintaining its lead over the other firm than the 
unsuccessful firm gains from catching up. The wages necessary to prevent spillovers amount 
to what an unsuccessful firm could gain from spillovers; the wages necessary to obtain 
spillovers amount to what the successful firm loses from spillovers. 
3.4 Equilibria when both Firms are Successful. 
We now examine the subgame that results when both firms have innovated successfully. We 
must consider three outcomes, symmetric spillovers, asymmetric spillovers, and no spillovers. 
To simplify our discussion, we make the following standard assumption. 
Assumption 2:    ( , ) ( , )1 1 11   . 
Thus firms prefer both having low costs to both having high costs.17 
Proposition 3: Suppose that assumption 2 holds. Then: 
(a) A symmetric spillover equilibrium exists if and only if       1,11 ,1  
   1 ,12 . Wages are  jiii ww        1 ,11 ,1 ,  i j, ,1 2, i j . 
The resulting net payoffs are    2 1 1 1 1       , ,   for both firms. 
(b) An asymmetric spillover equilibrium exists if and only if      1,11 ,1  
    1 ,12 . Up to  , the wage sum is determined as       1 1 1 1  , , . 
Up to  , the net payoffs are   1 1,   for both firms.18 
This result is proved in the appendix. The reasoning for (a) runs as follows. Symmetric 
spillovers require that neither firm wants to deviate by preventing spillovers to the competitor 
or by foregoing the possibility of obtaining spillovers. The condition in (a) makes sure such 
deviations are not profitable, because the profits in the resulting asymmetric situations are 
relatively low. In situation (b), profits are low for firms with similar costs, but high for 
asymmetric costs, favoring asymmetric spillovers and thus implying that the firm with both 
R&D-employees earns higher product market profits than the competitor. The firm with 
higher costs only accepts this if wages for the two R&D-workers are so high that firms have 
identical net payoffs (profits minus wages). This condition, however, only determines the sum 
of the wages for the two workers, not the wage for each individual worker. 
                                                           
17 The assumption may be violated for quantity competition under extreme conditions on demand elasticities (Shapiro 1989). 
If the assumption does not hold, a unique equilibrium exists in which no spillovers occur. 
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Under assumption 2 an equilibrium in pure strategies with either asymmetric or symmetric 
spillovers always exists. In the following we will neglect  . Thus, the only knife edge case is 
           1 11 2 1 1     , , , 1   for which both symmetric and asymmetric 
spillovers occur. For all other cases, the equilibrium is unique with respect to the occurrence 
of spillovers and net payoffs of firms. 
3.5 Summary 
Together, propositions 2 and 3 imply proposition 1. Thus, if spillovers increase total industry 
profits, there will be spillovers if one firm is successful and symmetric spillovers if both firms 
are successful. When spillovers do not increase total industry profits, there will be no 
spillovers if one firm is successful and asymmetric spillovers if both are successful. 
4. When do Spillovers Increase Total Industry Profits? 
We discuss for which assumptions on product market competition and on c0  and   spillovers 
increase total industry profits and hence which types of spillovers occur.  
4.1. Price competition with homogenous products 
Under Bertrand competition with homogenous products, firms’ profits are zero except when 
one firm has lower marginal costs than the competitor. Hence, 
(3)             00,01,01 ,11 ,1 ,11 ,1   . 
Thus, spillovers never increase total industry profits, because profits are positive only if a firm 
has lower marginal costs than its competitor. Using propositions 1 and 2, we immediately get: 
Corollary 1:    (i) Under Bertrand competition, there are no spillovers if only one firm is 
successful.  If both firms are successful, there are asymmetric spillovers, 
so that both employees work for one firm. 
  (ii) If both firms are successful, net profits amount to zero for both firms. 
The intuition is as follows. If one firm is successful, the competitor would gain nothing from 
spillovers; profits would still be zero. Hence, the successful firm’s employee will not obtain a 
positive wage from the competitor, and spillovers will be prevented at zero costs. If both firms 
are successful, profits are zero if there are no spillovers or bilateral spillovers. In both cases, 
an equilibrium would thus require both firms paying zero wages. But then firms could deviate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
18 The equilibrium is not unique with respect to the wages. 
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by offering low positive wages, resulting in a discontinuous profit increase. Thus, suppose 
there are asymmetric spillovers, so that one firm obtains positive product market profits and 
the competitor has zero profits. This can be an equilibrium provided the latter firm has no 
incentive to hire both employees from the former, that is, the total wage sum equals the 
product market profit of the firm with two employees, resulting in zero profits for both firms.  
With quantity competition, there tends to be greater spillover activity than in the Bertrand 
case, as the following result shows. 
Corollary 2:  Suppose firms engage in Cournot competition with demand x=a-p, and 
innovations are non-drastic, that is, a firm cannot become a monopolist if it has all the 
knowledge from innovations and spillovers. 
(i) If one firm is successful, asymmetric spillovers occur for    0258 ca   . 
(ii)If both firms are successful, symmetric spillovers occur if    3 2 2 0     a c . 
Asymmetric spillovers occur for    3 2 2 0     a c . 
The result, proved in the appendix, implies that all conceivable spillover possibilities arise for 
linear Cournot competition. If the cost reduction   and complementarities   are small, 
relative to the initial market size  0ca  , this favors spillovers. These conditions make sure 
that a firm cannot come close to a monopoly position by getting ahead of the competitor.  
Corollary 1 and 2 imply that with quantity competition spillovers are more likely than with 
price competition.19 
5. Implications for Innovation Incentives 
Endogenizing spillovers affects several results in the R&D and growth literature, and it has 
implications for public policy towards R&D and competition. To see this, we formulate the 
benchmark case of exogenous spillovers. Period 1 is as in section 2, but there is no 
competition for human capital. Instead, if one firm has innovated successfully, the other firm 
automatically obtains all possible spillovers. Hence, if both firms are successful, profits are 
  ( , )1 1  ; if only one firm is successful, profits are  ( , )1  and )1,( , respectively. 
For the exogenous and the endogenous case, we define unilateral innovation incentives as the 
expected additional profit for a firm from innovation, assuming that the competitor does not 
                                                           
19 Similarly, spillovers can be seen to be more likely for differentiated goods than for homogeneous goods. 
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innovate successfully. Bilateral innovation incentives are defined as the expected additional 
profit for a firm from innovation, when the competitor also innovates. Unilateral innovation 
incentives thus describe the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium (0,0) (net of wages, but 
gross of the innovation costs I). The higher the unilateral incentives, the less likely is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium where no firm invests. Similarly, the higher the bilateral 
incentives, the more likely is an equilibrium where both firms invest.  
5.1. The Effect of Spillover Endogeneity on Innovation Incentives 
It is straightforward to derive the following result. 
Proposition 4: (i) Unilateral investment incentives are identical in the exogenous case and in 
the endogenous case if spillovers increase total industry  profits. 
(ii) Unilateral investment incentives are higher in the endogenous case than in the exogenous 
case if spillovers do not increase total industry profits. 
Intuitively, when spillovers increase total industry profits (i), they will not be avoided in the 
endogenous case. Hence, spillovers will take place just as in the exogenous case, and 
incentives are the same. As for (ii), even though spillovers are costly to avoid in the 
endogenous case, incurring these costs is worthwhile: hence, the option to avoid spillovers 
makes investing firms better off than in the exogenous case.  
For bilateral incentives, we obtain the following result. 
Proposition 5: Suppose   1.  For sufficiently small knowledge complementarities, bilateral 
incentives are stronger under endogenous spillovers than under exogenous spillovers. 
A more precise statement and the proof are given in the appendix. Intuitively, the endogeneity 
of spillovers has three effects. First, in the endogenous case, a successful innovator tends to 
appropriate more of the surplus resulting from innovation than in the exogenous case because 
it has the option to prevent spillovers by incurring wage costs. Second, a firm that has not 
innovated successfully must pay to obtain spillovers in the endogenous case, whereas they are 
free in the exogenous case. Both effects make innovation more attractive in the endogenous 
case. Third, however, a successful firm that wants to benefit from knowledge 
complementarities will have to incur costs in the endogenous case, must pay a wage to attract 
a second employee. Thus, unlike in the exogenous case, innovation in itself does not yet 
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guarantee access to whatever complementary knowledge there is. This effect explains why 
endogeneity of spillovers may weaken innovation incentives for strong complementarities.20 
Homogeneous price competition provides a drastic illustration of the differences between 
endogenous and exogenous spillovers. By corollary 1, in this case spillovers never occur if 
only one firm is successful, and they are asymmetric if both firms are successful. Moreover, 
profits are independent of the possibility of endogenous spillovers and thus spillovers have no 
effect on innovation incentives. In contrast, (perfect) exogenous spillovers would destroy any 
profit from innovations and thus any innovation incentives. In particular, therefore, innovation 
incentives are much stronger in the endogenous case than in the exogenous case.21 
These ideas relate to the design of public policy towards R&D and competition. The literature 
has emphasized that spillovers may lead to underinvestment compared with social welfare 
maximization. This is obvious for the Bertrand case, where sufficiently high exogenous 
spillovers destroy any innovation incentives. For the Cournot case, the result has been shown 
by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Suzumura 1992, Leahy and Neary 1997.22 Our analysis 
suggests that underinvestment may not be such a big problem.23 Thus the case for allowing 
R&D cooperation (Spence 1984, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988) or improving patent 
protection (Gilbert and Shapiro 1990, Klemperer 1990, Gallini 1992) may not be so strong.24 
We note in passing that this implication of our approach may be reinforced when innovation 
costs are not treated as exogenous, but rather as wage payments to R&D-employees. The 
analysis so far strongly suggests the existence of rents for these employees in the spillover 
game. Anticipating such future rents, employees may be willing to accept below market wages 
initially. Therefore, it is not surprising that innovation incentives may be even higher than 
                                                           
20 Apart from strong complementarities, one would also require high probabilities that both firms are successful for this 
effect to matter. 
21 Similarly, if innovations are significant, i.e.,    is high, the costs of preventing spillovers are low, and hence innovation 
incentives are much stronger than in the exogenous case 
22 The result is non-trivial because of the well-known strategic (over-) investment incentive under quantity competition. 
23 Most closely related to our argument here is the point made by Leahy and Neary (1999). They show that innovation 
incentives may not be seriously affected by spillovers when “absorptive capacity” is required to make use of spillovers, 
and this capacity is improved by own R&D. 
24 However, our analysis does not invalidate another argument that is sometimes brought forward in favor of active R&D-
policy, namely that the diffusion of knowledge is socially desirable and that therefore spillovers should be encouraged 
rather than prevented. In our framework, the appropriability problem is less severe than in a setting with exogenous 
spillovers, the reason being that firms can avoid spillovers. Hence, if the main problem of R&D-policy is that there are not 
enough spillovers, then this problem will tend to be worse for endogenous spillovers. 
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suggested by our analysis if innovation costs consist of R&D-wages that can be below the 
market level. In the discussion paper, we provide a full analysis of this point.25 
5.2. Product Market Competition and Innovation Incentives 
The endogeneity of spillovers also affects the relation between innovation incentives and 
competition. We restrict ourselves to the case that   1, i.e. if spillovers occur, the 
competitor obtains all the knowledge of the innovating firm. In the appendix we show: 
Proposition 6: Suppose   1.  
(a)  With exogenous spillovers, Cournot competition always gives stronger unilateral 
innovation incentives than Bertrand competition. 
(b)  With endogenous spillovers, Bertrand competition always gives stronger unilateral 
innovation incentives than Cournot. 
Intuitively, with Bertrand competition, spillovers can always be avoided at zero costs in the 
endogenous case. Hence, incentives are as strong as in the case without spillovers. In the 
Cournot case, however, spillovers will not be avoided at all if spillovers increase total industry 
profits, and will be avoided at some costs (wage payments of     11 0 1, , ) if spillovers do 
not increase total industry profits. Hence, in the Cournot case, innovation incentives are 
adversely affected by the possibility of spillovers, whereas they remain unaffected in the 
Bertrand case. Therefore, the result comes at no surprise. 
6. Many Employees 
Although a full-fledged extension of our analysis to R&D groups with 1N  members is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we shall sketch some relevant ideas. For simplicity, assume 
that firms bid sequentially for the employees. Then, the nature of spillovers depends crucially 
on the distribution of knowledge over this group. An extreme assumption would be that each 
member possesses indispensable knowledge, without which the knowledge of the other 
employees has no value (perfect complementarity). In this case, our analysis carries over 
directly, with wage offers interpreted as offers to the entire group.  
At the other extreme, suppose each member possesses the entire knowledge of the group 
(perfect substitutability). Then, if one firm is successful, spillovers will only be prevented if 
                                                           
25 Another technique to increase innovation incentives that is absent in our setting would be to choose the type of innovation 
strategically towards innovations that are less relevant to the competitor. Such a possibility would lead to incentives to 
distort the type of R&D. 
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               1 0 1 1 1 0 1, , , , .   n  Hence, spillovers are much less likely to be 
prevented and therefore innovation incentives are lower.  
An intermediate case occurs when each member possesses knowledge that is mutually 
exclusive and specific knowledge can be added up to obtain the cost reduction potential of a 
firm. In Gersbach and Schmutzler (2000), we give sufficient conditions for ”no spillovers” 
and ”full spillovers”, respectively, where ”full spillovers” stands for the case that the entire 
group changes employers. There, we work with the simplifying assumption that the cost 
reduction obtained through spillovers depends only on the number of employees that change 
firms. We obtain a  natural generalization of the condition that spillovers arise if they increase 
total industry profits. Qualitatively, our results on innovation thus generalize to the N worker 
case. In particular, spillovers are more likely in the Cournot case than in the Bertrand case, 
which strengthens innovation incentives in the Bertrand case relative to Cournot. 
Summing up, it is more difficult to prevent spillovers with N workers. How likely spillovers 
are, depends on the distribution of knowledge within the firm and on product market 
properties that are similar to those identified before. 
7. Alternative Contractual Arrangements 
Our assumptions allow a firm to fully condition wages on the other firm’s research success as 
well as on its own success. It is useful to explore alternatives and most importantly to consider 
contractual incompleteness in the spirit of the contract theory literature (Hart 1995). 
Assumption 1B: The wage of firm i can only be conditioned on the success of its own worker;  
To justify this assumption, suppose the firms are asymmetrically informed about the success 
of their employees at the time they make wage offers, so that they cannot simply refrain from 
making wage offers to unsuccessful workers. This asymmetric information is, however, 
resolved before product market competition takes place, and success vectors become common 
knowledge. The information revealed is, however, not verifiable by third parties.  
Because of assumption 1B, wages will be denoted as    w s w sii i ij i and  for iji  ,2,1 . This 
modification has two countervailing effects. To see this, we restrict ourselves to the case 
  0 . Clearly,   00 iiw  must hold in any equilibrium: If a firm’s employee was not 
successful, there is no need to prevent his departure as he will be of no use to the competitor. 
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Further, 0)1( ijw : Absent complementarities, a firm does not gain from employing another 
worker.  Spillovers arise if only one firm, say firm 1, is successful and    01 2111 ww  .  
Consider the incentives of the non-successful firm 2 to set wages high enough to attract the 
other firm’s worker. By setting    10 1121 ww  , firm 2 will also get the worker of a non-
successful competitor, since     000 1121  ww  . Thus, firm 2 has expected product market 
profits of      z z  , ,1 1 0 0   after setting wages in this manner.26 Deviating by reducing 
wages to zero would lead to expected product market profits      z z 0 1 1 0 0, ,  . 
The expected benefits from spillovers are thus     z   , ,1 0 1 . This expression is smaller 
than for complete contracts (section 3.2.) where we calculated the benefits from spillovers as 
     , ,1 0 1 : For firm 2, setting wages    10 1121 ww   now only leads to useful knowledge 
if the competitor actually was successful, which happened with probability z . Similarly, 
incentives for a successful firm, say firm 1, to set    01 2111 ww   to avoid spillovers can be 
seen to be       1 1 0 1 v   , , .27 This is smaller than     ,10,1  , the corresponding 
amount for complete contracts. Intuitively, a successful firm that sets high wages for its own 
worker keeps the worker even when the other firm is also successful, in which case spillovers 
would be of no use to the competitor, and avoiding spillovers would thus be of no use to the 
successful firm. We obtain a difference of    v[ , , ]  1 0 1  between the gains from 
spillovers with complete and with incomplete contracts. 
As both incentives to obtain and incentives to avoid spillovers are lower with incomplete 
contracts, it is unclear a priori whether spillovers become more or less likely. We shall show 
that spillovers become more (less) likely under incomplete contracts if spillovers decrease 
(increase) total product market profits, that is, the effect of product market competition on the 
likelihood of spillovers becomes less pronounced. First, however, note that in general pure 
strategy equilibria do not exist. 
Proposition 7: Suppose that 1B holds,   0  and        1 0 1 1 0 1, , ,  . Then no 
equilibrium in stage 2 in pure strategies exists.28 
                                                           
26 Recall that z is the probability of success conditional on the competitor being non-successful. 
27 Recall that v is the probability of success conditional on the competitor being successful. 
28 Strictly speaking, we require that    2)1,1()0,1()1(  v  and    2)1,0()1,1()1(  v . 
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The proof is given in the appendix.29 Thus, only mixed strategy equilibria can exist and 
spillovers occur with some positive probability. Therefore, when profits decrease with 
spillovers, spillovers become more likely for incomplete contracts, since spillovers never arise 
for complete contracts. The opposite conclusion obtains if spillovers increase with contracts. 
Corollary 3: Suppose that   0  and     1 1 0 1, , . Suppose that spillovers decrease 
(increase) industry profits. Then, the probability of spillovers is higher (lower) with 
incomplete contracts than with complete contracts.  
Rather than considering incomplete contracts, one could also move into the other direction 
and allow for contracts that are conditioned on additional variables. For instance, contracts 
could depend on whether other employees are hired or not. With one employee in each firm, 
the game becomes slightly more complex than before because each firm now makes two wage 
offers to each worker, and each worker’s optimal choice of firms now depends on the other 
worker’s decision.  However, this modification has no essential effect on equilibria, except 
that wage offers are now conditioned on hiring decisions. For example, the equilibrium 3(a) 
would still hold provided that wages are as before if the competitor’s worker accepts the offer, 
but the own worker leaves, but fall to the willingness-to-pay for the second worker if both 
workers are employed in one firm. Since firms would not want to hire both employees at the 
equilibrium wages specified in proposition 3a, the symmetric spillover equilibrium obtains. 
The situation is different when each firm employs N>1 workers. Consider perfectly 
substitutable workers. Then a firm can offer wages to the competitor which are only effective 
if no other employees are hired. Thereby, the firm can avoid paying twice for the same 
knowledge. Similarly, a firm can offer his own employees wages which are effective only if 
nobody leaves, since otherwise protecting knowledge is worthless. Such contracts will 
increase the flexibility of firms to compete for R&D-workers. Since, the possibility of 
obtaining and protecting knowledge increase simultaneously in this setting, the effects on 
spillover are ambiguous.30 
Another potential extension are performance based wage contracts. For instance, with sales 
based contracts, wages are partly transformed from fixed costs into marginal costs. 
Considering the case of one successful firm, a first consequence of such a change is that gross 
                                                           
29 If    1,01,1   , as for instance in the Bertrand case, a (unique) equilibrium in pure strategies with incomplete contracts 
still exists, since a non-successful firm has no incentive to offer any positive wages. 
30 To examine this case, a complex multi-auction approach is necessary. 
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product market profits i  become less sensitive to which firm employs the worker, as the cost 
reductions from employment are partly compensated by wage increases. This, in itself, would 
decrease both incentives to obtain and incentives to prevent spillovers. Also, industry output 
and total gross profits for any given cost reduction would tend to decrease because of the 
higher variable costs, which, other things being equal, would decrease innovation incentives. 
This, however, has to be weighed against savings from lower fixed wage payments. The net 
effect on innovation activities is ambiguous. 
8. Relation to the Licensing Literature 
As mentioned before, our approach bears some similarity with the ex-post licensing literature. 
Most closely related is Katz and Shapiro (1985). In their paper, a firm that has a patent for a 
cost-reducing innovation licenses the innovation to a competitor in return for a fixed fee. This 
happens if and only if industry profits increase if licensing takes place. Of course, this 
resembles our result that spillovers take place with complete contracts if and only if they lead 
to an increase in industry profits. However, there are four important differences between the 
licensing case and our approach. 
First, note the distributional issues in the case where industry profits increase. With a license, 
the beneficiaries of licensing will be the owners of both firms, depending on the license fee. If 
knowledge is transferred through endogenous spillovers, the innovator loses the benefits to the 
employees who enjoy a wage increase. Second, as a result of these distributional issues, the 
possibility of licensing has a substantially different effect on innovation incentives than the 
possibility of endogenous spillovers. The relation is particularly simple for unilateral 
incentives: The option of ex post licensing can only increase innovation incentives; the 
possibility of endogenous spillovers, however, usually decreases innovation incentives.31 
Third, the number of knowledge bearing employees has a diluting effect that is absent in the 
licensing literature. As the number of relevant workers increases, the likelihood of knowledge 
transfer increases. Finally, contractual incompleteness seems to play a greater role in the case 
of knowledge transfer through the human capital market.  Licenses can be conditioned on 
whether they actually involve useful knowledge, but this is much more difficult with wage 
contracts for employees. We have shown, however, that with incomplete contracts the role of 
                                                           
31 Bilateral incentives are less trivial: if the competitor innovates, the chance of obtaining a license ex post may reduce 
innovation incentives. 
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product market competition becomes less pronounced in determining whether spillovers take 
place. 
9. Conclusion 
We investigated under which conditions spillovers arise endogenously when firms compete in 
the market for human capital and in the product market. Spillovers between two firms 
competing in prices are more likely when products are differentiated, when there is quantity 
rather than price competition, when the two firms are not alone in the market, and when the 
market is big relative to the size of the cost reduction. Thus, the conditions under which firms 
compete in the product market determine the extent of technological spillovers. 
We saw that our approach has potential policy implications. Not only does our approach 
suggest that the appropriability problem is weaker than generally believed, it also casts doubts 
on assertions that sharp price competition reduces innovation incentives. Any stronger policy 
conclusions should of course be preceded by a thorough robustness discussion. While only 
future research can establish whether our results can be applied more broadly, we believe that 
similar results are likely to hold for situations with many employees. Firms will find 
additional ways to ensure that small number of workers will not be able to take all knowledge 
to competitors. Therefore, innovation incentives should still remain high if competition is 
intense. 
Our approach to endogenize spillovers may not only be useful for a modified view of how 
unprotected knowledge affects innovation incentives, but it may also shed light on other 
issues. For instance, a simple reinterpretation of our approach is that it provides some 
predictions about the determinants of labor mobility. Applying the results of section 4, we find 
that qualified labor is more likely to move between firms when innovations are small, when 
products are differentiated and so on.  
There are many useful extensions of our model. For instance, firms might be allowed to hire 
new workers in the second period, as an alternative to poaching. This would reduce the 
willingness to pay for the competitor’s employees, suggesting that spillovers would decrease 
and innovation incentives might increase.32 Also, one might consider the case where private 
information about costs is not resolved at the beginning of product market competition. In this 
                                                           
32 Another extension is to consider a continuous innovation variable. For such an attempt in the case of perfect 
complementarity see Gersbach and Schmutzler (2002). 
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case, the wage competition case would have signaling effects: An employee willing to accept 
a wage offer by a new firm may reveal that he possesses little knowledge which, in turn makes 
it less costly for firms to keep employees with knowledge. Therefore innovation incentives 
might increase if complementarities are weak.  
Overall, endogenizing technological spillovers by considering the human capital market is a 
promising avenue towards understanding knowledge flows and innovation incentives. The 
work on these issues has just begun. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 2: For the successful firm 1, we only have to show that setting 
   w w11 211 0 0 1, ,  to avoid spillovers does not increase its profits; that is, 
       1 0 121, , 1,0 w . This holds because the right hand side of this inequality is equal to 
  1, . For firm 2, which is not successful, setting the wage high enough to attract the other 
firm’s worker is worthwhile. This follows because      w21 0 1 1 0 1, , ,     and 
            , , , ,1 1 1 0 0 1    imply        , ,1 0 121 w 0,1 . Similar arguments 
establish (ii).  
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) By lemma 1 and the symmetry of the equilibrium, it suffices to 
check three deviations for firm i.  
(1)  Firm i does not benefit from setting the wage for its own employee high enough to avoid 
spillovers, but at the same time leaving the wage offer for the other firm’s worker unchanged 
so that it obtains his services, that is:     ijiiij www -1 ,1  -1 ,1   . Inserting the 
equilibrium wage, this becomes         1 1 1 1    , ,    . 
 (2)  It is not profitable to reduce the wage offer for the other firm’s worker without changing 
the offer for the own employee, and therefore forego the benefits from spillovers, while letting 
the other firms reap the benefits of spillovers. This condition requires: 
       1 1 1 1    , ,   wij . Inserting the value of wij  gives    1  ,1  
       1 ,11 ,11 ,1 , which holds by the assumption of the proposition. 
(3) It is not profitable to reduce the wage offer for the other firm’s worker and increase the 
wage offer for the own employee to wii    so that there will be no spillovers. This holds if 
       1 1 11     , , ( )   w wij ii , which follows from assumption 2. 
Therefore (1) always holds with equality; (2) and (3) hold under the assumption of the 
proposition and assumption 2. Hence, an equilibrium with symmetric spillovers exists. 
(b) In the proposed equilibrium one firm employs both workers. Suppose this is firm 1. Then 
its best response conditions (BRC) are as follows: 
(i)        1 1 1 112 11    , ,    w w  
(ii)      1 1 1 112  , ,    w  
(iii)        1 1 1 111    , ,     w  
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For example, the first condition makes sure firm 2 does not deviate by reducing its wage 
offers to both workers, so that they both work for the competitor. Doing so would lead to 
wage savings of w w11 12 . (i) makes sure these wage savings do not exceed the resulting drop 
in profits. The other conditions follow similarly. The BRC for firm 2 are 
(iv)        1 1 1 1 12 11, , (  + )     w w  
(v)      1 1 1 1 12, ,       w  
(vi)           1 1 1 1 11, ,         w  
For example, consider condition (iv). This makes sure firm 2 does not deviate by paying the 
minimum wages w11    necessary to obtain the services of the other firm’s worker and keep 
its own worker by matching the competitor’s offer w12. (v) and (vi) have similar 
interpretations. Conditions (i) to (vi) can be summarized as follows:  
(i) and (iv) hold if and only if 
(vii)                1 1 1 1 1 1 1 112 11         , , , ,    w w , 
which implies    w w12 11 1 1 1 1       , ,   up to  . 
To satisfy (iii)/(vi) and (ii)/(v), we need  
(viii)                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111          , , , ,      w  
(ix)             1 1 11 1 1 1 112     , , , ,     w  
 (viii) and (ix) are conditions on wages and profits. The profit condition in (viii) is equivalent 
to             1 1 1 1 2 1 1      , , ,    and thus to the assumption in proposition 
3. Similarly, the (ix) requires that          1 1 1 1 2 1 1   , , ,    which is implied by 
(viii) because of assumption 2. 
Finally, wages    w11 1 1 1 1          , ,  and    w12 1 1 1 1        , ,   
satisfy the equilibrium conditions (vii) to (ix), using assumption 2 in the latter case. These 
choices of w11  and w12  are part of the equilibrium where w w w w22 12 21 11  ;   . Note that 
there are infinitely many other combinations satisfying (vii) - (ix), but they cannot be 
distinguished in terms of net payoffs for firms since the sum of the wages paid remains the 
same. 
If             1 1 1 1 2 1 1      , , ,   , (viii) is violated, and thus no equilibrium 
with asymmetric spillovers occurs. If the condition in b) is not fulfilled, case a) occurs. (q.e.d.) 
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Proof of Corollary 2: Let  ocaK . Also, recall in the following that a firm with 
marginal costs ic  that faces a competitor jc  has profits   92
2
ji cca  . 
(i) Using proposition 2, if one firm is successful, asymmetric spillovers occur if and only if 
       1 ,0- 1,   ,1- 0 ,1   , i.e.,          2-  )1(2  )1( -   2222  KKKK   
or equivalently    0258 ca   . 
(ii) By proposition 3, in this case, symmetric spillovers occur for     1 ,12    
     1 ,11 ,1  which, using (5) and (6) yields  2 2 3 20a c           . Asymmetric 
spillovers occur if  2 2 3 20a c           .(q.e.d.) 
Proof of proposition 5: We prove the following result:  
(i) If spillovers increase total industry profits, bilateral incentives are stronger under 
endogenous spillovers than under exogenous spillovers if and only if 
      ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 0 11 1 1 1 1      . 
(ii) If spillovers do not increase total industry profits, bilateral incentives are stronger under 
endogenous spillovers than under exogenous spillovers if and only if  
     )1,1()1,1()1,0()1,1()1,1(2)1,0()0,1()1(   qvqvvq . 
Claim (i) follows immediately from the following considerations. Propositions 2 and 3 show 
that expected profits are         0,010,11,12  qq   for a non-innovator and 
                0,0110,11,1311,11,12  vqvqqv   for an 
innovator. In the exogenous case, a firm that does no innovate earns      .0,011,1  qq   An 
innovator earns            qv q v q v    1 1 1 2 11 1 1 0 0      , , , .   
Result (i) now follows by straightforward arithmetics. The proof of (ii) is analogous.  
If complementarities are sufficiently small, condition (ii) is fulfilled and incentives under 
endogenous spillovers are stronger than under exogenous spillovers. 
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Proof of proposition 6: 
(a)  Incentives for Bertrand are      .00,01,1 q  Incentives for Cournot are 
        09340,01,1 20  caqq  . 
(b)  In the Bertrand case, proposition 2 implies that there are no spillovers if a firm is 
successful, and profits for a successful firm are     00,1 caq . The equilibrium 
condition for (0,0) is thus   .0 Icaq   
In the Cournot case, we first consider the case that spillovers increase total industry profits, 
which requires  023 ca   by corollary 2. By proposition 1, there will be spillovers if a 
firm is successful, in which case it obtains  
9
1,1
2K
  with  0caK . Hence, unilateral 
innovation incentives are:      0,01,1 q      929 0222 caqKKq  . Thus, 
a firm does not want to innovate if:    .92 02 Icaq   Therefore, incentives for Bertrand 
are stronger if and only if     020 29 caqcaq   which always holds.  
If spillovers do not increase total industry profits a successful firm obtains product market 
profits        1 0 11 0 1, , , .   Innovation incentives in the Cournot case are therefore 
                94920,01,01,10,1 22222 qKKKKqq   . 
Hence, unilateral incentives are greater for Bertrand if and only if   qcaq 249   
which always holds. 
Proof of proposition 7:  Suppose there is a pure strategy equilibrium with spillovers whenever 
only one firm is successful. In such an equilibrium,      10 jjij ww  must hold for ;2,1i  
ij   . Suppose that, e.g., firm 1 is successful. As the proposed equilibrium requires 
)1(0)1( 1121 ww   and  )0(21)1(11 ww  , firm 1’s expected net equilibrium payoffs are 
        1,1111,1 11  vwv  =    11,1 11vw . Thus, firm 1’s best response is   0111 w . 
Thus, an equilibrium would require   021w . But then firm 1 would have an incentive to set 
   021 2111 ww    to obtain the benefits       1 1 0 1 1 0  v  , ,  that are higher than the 
wage costs. Hence, no equilibrium in pure strategies with spillovers exists. The argument for 
no-spillover equilibria is similar.  
28 
 
References: 
Aghion, P., Howitt, P. (1992), A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction, 
Econometrica 60, 323-351. 
Anton, J., Yao, D. A. (1995), Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 11, 362-378. 
Cohen, W. and Levinthal, D. (1989), Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D, 
Economic Journal 99, 569-596. 
D`Aspremont, C., and Jacquemin, A. (1988), Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in 
Duopoly with Spillovers, American Economic Review, 78, 1133-1137. 
Gallini, N. (1984), Deterrence through Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing, 
American Economic Review, 74, 931-941. 
Gallini, N. (1992), Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, Rand Journal of Economics, 23, 52-63. 
Gerowski, P. (1995), Do Spillovers Undermine the Incentive to Innovate? in S. Dowrick 
(ed.), Economic Approaches to Innovation, Edward Elgar, Aldershot. 
Gersbach, H. and Schmutzler, A. (2000), Endogenous Technological Spillovers: Causes and 
Consequences, mimeo, Heidelberg University and University of Zurich. 
Gersbach, H. and Schmutzler, A. (2002), Endogenous Spillovers and Incentives for 
Innovation, Economic Theory, forthcoming. 
Gilbert, R., and Shapiro, C. (1990), Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 21, 106-112. 
Griliches, Z. C. (1979), Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to 
Productivity Growth, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 1979, 92-116. 
Grossman, G., and Helpman, E. (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Hermes, M. (1996), Enough for one Lifetime - Wallace Carrothers, Inventor of Nylon, 
American Chemical Society and Chemical Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC. 
Kamien, M. I., Muller, E., and Zang, I. (1992), Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels, 
American Economic Review, 82, 1293-1306. 
Katsoulacos, Y., and Ulph, D. (1998), Endogenous Innovation Spillovers and Technology 
Policy. 
Katz, M., and Shapiro, C. (1985), On the Licensing of Innovations, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 16, 504-520. 
Klemperer, P. (1990), How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection be?, Rand Journal 
of Economics, 21, 113-130. 
Klette, J. (1996), R&D, Scope Economies, and Plant Performance, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 27 (3), 502-522. 
Leahy, D., and Neary, J.P. (1997), Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries, 
American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
29 
Leahy, D. and Neary, J.P. (1999), Absorptive Capacity, R&D Spillovers, and Public Policy, 
Mimeo, University College Dublin. 
Marshall, A. (1920), Principles of Economics, Macmillan, London. 
Martin, P., and Ottaviano, G. (1997), Growing Locations: Industry Locations in a Model of 
Endogenous Growth, Paper presented at the CEPR/NBER-workshop on international trade, 
Paris, May 1997. 
Pakes, A. Nitzan, S. (1983), Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employ-
ment, and the Establishment of ”Rival” Enterprises, Journal of Labor Economics, 1, 4. 
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (1999), A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R&D 
Duopoly, Review of Industrial Organization, 15, 253-262. 
Romer, P. (1986), Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political Economy, 
94, 1002-1037. 
Romer, P. (1990), Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 71-
102. 
Shapiro, C. (1989), Theories of Oligopoly Behavior in R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, 
Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Spence, A.M. (1984), Cost reduction, Competition and Industry Performance, Econometrica, 
52, 101-21. 
Suzumura, K. (1992), Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with 
Spillovers, American Economic Review, 82, 1307-1320. 
 
